Shall I trust you? From child-robot interaction to trusting relationships by Di Dio, C. (ORCID:0000-0002-3962-4684) et al.
fpsyg-11-00469 April 2, 2020 Time: 17:58 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 03 April 2020
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00469
Edited by:
Ilaria Grazzani,
University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
Reviewed by:
Flavia Lecciso,
University of Salento, Italy
Antonella D’Amico,
University of Palermo, Italy
*Correspondence:
Cinzia Di Dio
cinzia.didio@unicatt.it
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Developmental Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 20 December 2019
Accepted: 28 February 2020
Published: 03 April 2020
Citation:
Di Dio C, Manzi F, Peretti G,
Cangelosi A, Harris PL, Massaro D
and Marchetti A (2020) Shall I Trust
You? From Child–Robot Interaction
to Trusting Relationships.
Front. Psychol. 11:469.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00469
Shall I Trust You? From Child–Robot
Interaction to Trusting Relationships
Cinzia Di Dio1* , Federico Manzi1, Giulia Peretti1, Angelo Cangelosi2, Paul L. Harris3,
Davide Massaro1 and Antonella Marchetti1
1 Research Unit on Theory of Mind, Department of Psychology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy, 2 School of
Computer Science, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom, 3 Graduate School of Education, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA, United States
Studying trust in the context of human–robot interaction is of great importance given
the increasing relevance and presence of robotic agents in the social sphere, including
educational and clinical. We investigated the acquisition, loss, and restoration of trust
when preschool and school-age children played with either a human or a humanoid
robot in vivo. The relationship between trust and the representation of the quality
of attachment relationships, Theory of Mind, and executive function skills was also
investigated. Additionally, to outline children’s beliefs about the mental competencies of
the robot, we further evaluated the attribution of mental states to the interactive agent. In
general, no substantial differences were found in children’s trust in the play partner as a
function of agency (human or robot). Nevertheless, 3-year-olds showed a trend toward
trusting the human more than the robot, as opposed to 7-year-olds, who displayed
the reverse pattern. These findings align with results showing that, for 3- and 7-year-
olds, the cognitive ability to switch was significantly associated with trust restoration in
the human and the robot, respectively. Additionally, supporting previous findings, we
found a dichotomy between attributions of mental states to the human and robot and
children’s behavior: while attributing to the robot significantly lower mental states than
the human, in the Trusting Game, children behaved in a similar way when they related
to the human and the robot. Altogether, the results of this study highlight that similar
psychological mechanisms are at play when children are to establish a novel trustful
relationship with a human and robot partner. Furthermore, the findings shed light on the
interplay – during development – between children’s quality of attachment relationships
and the development of a Theory of Mind, which act differently on trust dynamics as a
function of the children’s age as well as the interactive partner’s nature (human vs. robot).
Keywords: developmental robotics, HRI, Theory of Mind, attachment, social interaction
INTRODUCTION
One of the challenges of contemporary robotics is long-term interaction, which assumes that
competent robot partners will have many human-like characteristics, enabling the complexity
and multidimensionality of human interactions. This objective has been strengthened by a new
interdisciplinary approach to robotics, i.e. Developmental Robotics (Cangelosi and Schlesinger,
2015). For example, Vinanzi et al. (2019) have proposed an artificial cognitive architecture to
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simulate human decision making in the robot by using concepts
from developmental theories, such as Theory of Mind (ToM).
From this perspective, the implementation of an artificial
architecture, together with an understanding of the human’s
response to the behavior of a robot within a relational context,
aims to shed light on the processes involved in establishing a
relationship with robotic agents (e.g. Wykowska et al., 2016;
Wiese et al., 2017). Within this framework, trust comes into
play as a key psychological component underpinning successful
interpersonal relationships, particularly when these include at
least one robotic agent. In the present study, we observed children
between the ages of 3 and 9 who established relationships of trust
with a human or the humanoid robot NAO in a simple “guessing”
game in which the child and the human or robot played together.
Furthermore, not only did we assess trust acquisition, but also
a key feature of real-life relational dynamics: trust restoration
after trust loss. As a matter of fact, trust is a dynamic process
based on past relational experiences and, as such, it is subject
to fluctuations operationalized in this study via three phases of
trust: acquisition, loss, and restoration. The latter phase is of
particular interest. While human forgiveness has been studied
in different conditions (see, for example, Grover et al., 2019),
the investigation of how relational failures may affect trust
restoration in a relationship with a robot is still unexplored.
In psychology, trust can be described as “a multidimensional
psychological attitude involving beliefs and expectations about
the reliability of the trustee resulting from social experiences
involving uncertainty and risk” (Jones and George, 1998; in
Lewis et al., 2018, p. 137). Trust in the choices of unknown
people can be envisaged also in situations where we passively
witness their behavior, with consequences on our own decisions
(e.g. Rizzato et al., 2016). The multidimensional nature of trust
encompasses the idea that trust can be built based on either (or
both) objective factors or (and) an emotional, quite irrational,
attitude toward the partner (Lahno, 2001). In this light, emotional
trust can be conceived as somewhat independent of objective
information. In this study, we recreated a situation of total
uncertainty in which the choices of a partner, who should be
trusted, are not based on the evaluation of objective elements,
and also the decision of the child to trust in the partner are
devoid of rational elements. Rather, the decision to trust or
not to trust the partner’s choices is consequentialist in nature
considering that, until proven otherwise, the partner is always
accurate in her/his/its choices. That is, trust is progressively built
through constant endorsement of the play partners’ reliability in
providing correct responses (see, Rotenberg, 2010). From this
perspective, conformation to the other’s choices reflected levels of
trust acquisition as well as acceptance of the other as a potential
partner (Nass et al., 1995; Nass and Moon, 2000).
The establishment of trusting relationships is critical for
effective interpersonal dynamics. This is particularly relevant
where children are called to build new relationships with peers,
educators, and other adults. An example of the importance of
the construction of interpersonal trust is highlighted in a study
with children under protection services (Petrocchi et al., 2018). In
these critical circumstances, not only does the success of the social
interventions rely on building trusting relationships between
the child’s parents and the social workers, but also between the
latter and the child in need of psychosocial adjustment (Hafford-
Letchfield and Spatcher, 2007). Developmental research on the
construction of trusting relationships shows that trust dynamis
change significantly as a function of age. For example, children
aged 3 years tend to display trust if the informant is consistently
182 accurate (Clément et al., 2004; Koenig et al., 2004; Pasquini
et al., 2007) but are relatively unforgiving in case of mistakes
(Harris, 2007), effectively showing a certain behavioral rigidity.
With development, particularly from 4 years of age, children
become more flexible: they do not rely on another’s testimony in
an indiscriminate fashion (Harris, 2007) and show selective trust
in others’ testimony (Clément et al., 2004; Chan and Tardif, 2013).
They attend both to the information available at that moment,
and to the reliability that a person has shown in the past.
Human trusting relationships are also shaped by past
relational histories, originating with primary caregivers (e.g.
Camisasca et al., 2017; Giovanelli et al., 2020; Marchetti
et al., 2020) and extending to subsequent, significant affective
relationships (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). It has been suggested
that children’s decision to place trust in an unknown informant,
especially in a context of uncertainty, may also depend on
generalizing from their personal attachment history (Fonagy,
1998; Allison and Fonagy, 2016; Fonagy et al., 2019; see
also, Bo et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2018). For example,
securely attached children are more flexible in establishing
trustful relationships with epistemically reliable strangers than
children with a fragile relational past (see, for example,
Corriveau et al., 2009). In this view, we may ask about
interactions that involve partners with whom there is no
affective history and with whom a relationship needs to be
built on the basis of novel interactional dynamics that develop
hic et nunc.
Likewise, the development of the individual’s cognitive
competencies is important, particularly for the definition of
the informant’s epistemic reliability. Cognitive skills allow
individuals to reason about the other’s perspective and to
objectively evaluate informational access. In this respect, the
development of a ToM enabling individuals to conceptualize
the mental states that guide behavior (Wimmer and Perner,
1983) and social competence (Premack and Woodruff, 1978;
Perner and Wimmer, 1985; see also, Lombardi et al., 2018; for
a review, see Wellman et al., 2001) is a necessary prerequisite
for the establishment of trusting relationships (Fusaro and
Harris, 2008; Lecciso et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2011; Lucas
et al., 2013; Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; Rotenberg et al., 2015;
Van Reet, 2015). The association between the establishment
of trust and the development of ToM competencies was
first hypothesized by Koenig and Harris (2005) who found
that only 4-year-olds, and not 3-year-olds, showed selective
trust toward a previously accurate informant. More recently,
associating trust beliefs with ToM abilities in children aged
9 years, Rotenberg et al. (2015) further showed that children’s
trust beliefs in others are associated with both second-order
false belief ToM ability as well as with advanced ToM
abilities (see also Van Reet et al., 2015). As well-documented
(e.g. Carlson and Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995), there is
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a strict relationship between false belief understanding and
more general executive function skills. One may then question
about the overlap between these competencies in building
trust. Still, socio-cognitive skills mediated by one’s ability to
understand the others’ knowledge, like false belief, appear to
be more influential in building selective trust rather than more
general executive function skills, at least in some cultures
(Lucas et al., 2013).
In relation to human–robot interaction, studies that have
specifically investigated trust in a robot agent or system have
typically involved adult participants. These studies have either
used explicit measures of trust assessment, mostly involving self-
reports (e.g. Yagoda and Gillan, 2012), or implicit measures
of trust assessment. Explicit measures of trust are strongly
subject to the idiosyncratic attitude and the impression that
one has of the robot, which are often based on beliefs and
not on actual interactional experiences with the robot; on the
other hand, implicit measures of trust generally involve the
postulation of hypotheses framed by specific environmental
and theoretical conditions that are then tested during actual
interaction with a robotic system. Gaudiello et al. (2016), for
example, investigated the role played by functional acceptance
(perceived ease of use, usefulness) and social acceptance
(generally linked to social competencies) of the robot iCub for
effective human–robot interaction. These two aspects appear to
be most consistently associated with an enduring perception
of the robot’s skills, i.e. its usefulness and sociality (Shaw-
Garlock, 2009; Heerink, 2010). As a most comprehensive measure
of functional and social acceptance of the robot, the users’
trust in the robot was assessed as a function of the robot’s
social and functional knowledge. The users’ trust in the robot
prevalently relied on its functional rather than social knowledge,
although data generally highlighted adults’ poor acceptance of,
and a predominant distrust in robots. With children, the factors
underpinning child human–robot interaction have not been
systematically explored. There are several studies that inform
about ways in which children interact, play, and learn from a
robotic agent in school and educational contexts (Kanda et al.,
2004; Okumura et al., 2013a,b; Breazeal et al., 2016; Baxter
et al., 2017; Belpaeme et al., 2018; Cangelosi and Schlesinger,
2018; Di Dio et al., 2019). These studies have shown that
children tend to interact with robot partners in a human-
like manner, proving to be sensitive to verbal and non-verbal
signals, such as eye gaze (Okumura et al., 2013a,b), and
often attributing mentalistic competencies to the robot (for a
review, see Marchetti et al., 2018). In this respect, the work
by Short et al. (2010) shows that unfair/cheating robots in
a common “rock-paper-scissors” child-game are able to elicit
interest in the child as well as a greater tendency to attribute
intentions to the robot. This study brings further support
to the idea that human-like behavior (either trustful or even
deceptive) is associated to a greater interactional potential toward
a robot partner.
In the present study, trust was explored through a novel
Trusting Game (TG) named “Guess where it is” requiring
the interactive partner (either the human or the robot) and,
subsequently, the child to guess the position of a doll hidden
under a box. Through the structure of the game, we set the
conditions for the child to consequentially make the same
decisions as the play partner, thus ultimately establishing a
trusting relationship (e.g. Nass and Moon, 2000): the other
becomes trustworthy because it demonstrates that her/his/its
choices, even if random, always lead to a correct answer. This
procedure benefitted from having the child gradually build
trust in the partner during a social interaction. It was chosen
not to establish epistemic trust before the game following
best known procedures (see, for example, Koenig and Harris,
2005; Corriveau and Harris, 2009) because we also wanted to
appreciate the dynamics of trust construction when interacting
with different relational agents, i.e. the human and the robot.
Once trust had been acquired, as indexed by a consistent
agreement between the play partner’s and the child’s responses,
the phases of loss of trust and trust restoration put the child’s
trust to test. These latter phases were most critical for the
child because s/he had to reconsider the newly established
trust in the robot or the human. To better understand what
psychological factors are in place when building a trusting
relationship with the robot, as compared to the human, we
addressed specific different chronological ages (e.g. Lombardi
et al., 2017) where the development of affective and cognitive
processes may be distinctively influential on trust. Also, to better
appreciate how trust is configured within robot–human and
human–human interaction, we avoided creating competitive or
collaborative conditions that could have polarized the dynamics
of trust-building. As a matter of fact, the type of interaction
can significantly influence trust (Hancock et al., 2011) by
negatively or positively skewing trust in case of competition
or collaboration, respectively (Kidd, 2003; Kuchenbrandt and
Eyssel, 2012). Therefore, we had the children play for the
mere fun of playing with a little thank-you gift delivered at
the end of the game (the structure of the TG is detailed in
section “Materials and Methods”). Finally, we further assessed
the distinctive contribution of ToM and executive function
skills in building trust at different developmental ages, thus
extending current literature by also exploring these cognitive
components when children interacted with a robot or a
human agent.
To make the child perceive the robotic agent NAO as a
real interactional partner, it was introduced to children in a
preliminary session when they were familiarized with some of
the robot’s physical and social skills (walking, moving its arms,
talking, greeting, etc.) (see Vogt et al., 2017). To make its behavior
human-like, when playing its turn during the TG, NAO used
simple and clear verbal indications, accompanied by gestures
indicating the possible target position of the doll. Additionally,
the robot was programmed to alternate between looking at the
play setup and the child, reproducing a realistic attentional shift
(Zanatto et al., 2019).
The children’s perception of the robot’s mental qualities as
compared to the human was evaluated through the Attribution
of Mental States (AMS) questionnaire (Di Dio et al., 2018, 2019).
This measure has consistently shown that school-age children do
discriminate between the human and the robot in mental terms,
although, during interaction, children also typically display
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similar behaviors toward both. Accordingly, we hypothesized to
find substantial differences in the children’s attribution of mental
states to the human and the robot, whereas a similar trust-
building dynamics when interacting with either partner during
the TG. Additionally, we hypothesized to find a greater tendency
to trust, especially in the human, among younger children whose
trust is possibly mainly driven by affect rather than cognition.
On the other hand, we hypothesized to find the establishment of
more reflective trusting relationships among children given the
development of ToM competencies. No specific predictions were
advanced with respect to the role of executive functions in trust
dynamics given the fair lack of specific evidence in this respect.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Ninety-four (94) Italian kindergarten and school-age children
participated in the experiment. The children were divided into
four age groups as follows: 3-year-olds (N = 22, 9 females), 5-
year-olds (N = 24, 13 females), 7-year-olds (N = 25, 13 females),
and 9-year-olds (N = 23, 12 females). The children were recruited
from a preschool and a primary school of Milan. The children’s
parents received a written explanation of the procedure of the
study, the measurement items, and the materials used, and they
gave written consent. Children were not identified by parents
or teachers for learning and/or socio-relational difficulties. The
study was approved by the Local Ethics Committee (Università
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan).
Tasks
The children were assessed in two experimental sessions on
different days within a 2-week time frame. In the first session,
the children were administered the following tests: AMS scale
(inspired by the work of Martini et al., 2016), TG task [inspired
by the work of Yang et al. (2017)], and a first-order and (for
5- to 9-year-olds) a second-order False-Belief task (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983; Perner and Wimmer, 1985). In the second
session, the children were administered a further version of
the first-order and second-order False-Belief task, the quality
of attachment relationships (SAT) test (Liverta Sempio et al.,
2001), an executive function task (Dimensional Change Card
Sort, DCCS; Zelazo, 2006) for the 3- and 5-year-olds, and
the Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment (NEPSY II;
Korkman et al., 2007) subtest for the 7- and 9-year-olds. Both tests
assess the ability to switch between responses.
Attribution of Mental States
The AMS scale is a measure of the mental states that participants
attribute when looking at pictures depicting specific characters,
in this case a human and the robot NAO. The scale is an
ad hoc questionnaire that was based on Martini et al. (2016).
AMS has been used in previous works (Di Dio et al., 2018,
2019; see also, Di Dio et al., 2020; Manzi et al., 2020) and
has proven fairly consistent in outlining age-specific response
patterns with respect to attribution of mental states to both
robots and humans. Children were asked 25 questions grouped in
five different state categories: Perceptive, Emotional, Desires and
Intentions, Imaginative, and Epistemic. The child had to respond
“Yes” or “No” to each question. If the answer was Yes, then the
experimenter asked a follow-up question: “How much? A little bit
or very much?”, yielding a 3-point scale. For example, in answer
to the question: “Do you think that he/she/it can understand?”,
the range of answers could be: No (0), Yes, a little bit (1), or
Yes, very much (2). The total score was the sum of all answers
(range = 0–50); the five partial scores were the sum of the answers
within each category (score range = 0–10).
Trusting Game
The TG was inspired by the work of Yang et al. (2017). The
game requires the play partner (either the human or the robot)
and the child guess the position of a doll hidden under a box.
By its nature, the game is neither explicitly collaborative nor
competitive since both players have to independently guess the
position of the doll and correct guesses do not lead to any
tangible reward. The TG involves two players (i.e. a child –
participant – playing with either the experimenter or the robot)
and a game-master (i.e. a second experimenter). The game
consists of presenting to the players two boxes and a little doll
that are positioned on a table that looks very much like a coffee
table and at which both players are seated. The game-master,
who sits on the opposite side of the table, hides the doll under
one of the two boxes without being seen by the two players (see
Figure 1 for a depiction of the experimental setup). The game
consists of guessing where the game-master has hidden the doll.
The game starts with the experimenter explaining verbally to the
players the rules, showing them an example of a sequence: “Now
you and (the other partner’s name) will play a game together
called “guess where it is.” I’ll show you how it is played. Here
are two boxes and a little doll. I will hide the doll under one of
the two boxes, but you won’t see where I hide it because I will
put this paper board in front of you, like this.” After positioning
the board, the experimenter moves the boxes around and then
removes the board, placing it on the side of the table. The
experimenter then informs the partners that they have to guess
where the doll has been hidden by pointing at one of the boxes.
Next, without revealing the doll’s location, the experimenter asks:
“It is all clear?”. If both partners answer positively, then the
play started. All children understood the instructions the first
time. The children were also informed that they would receive
a packet of stickers at the end of the game to thank them
for their participation. Once the game began, the experimenter
told the child that the partner (referred to by her/his/its name)
would always make the first guess. The position of the doll was
established a priori to correctly instruct (or program, if NAO) the
play partner’s choice during each phase of the game.
The TG involves three independent phases. The first phase
[Trusting Acquisition (TA)] aims to assess the participant’s
acquisition of trust in the other player by calculating how many
trials elapse before the child follows the other player’s guess.
Trust is assumed when the child follows the other player’s guess
on three consecutive trials. After trust acquisition, the game
switches into the second phase [Mistrust Acquisition (MA)],
which assesses the participant’s acquisition of mistrust in the
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the experimental setup in the Trust Game. (A) Overview of the participants’ seating arrangement and stimuli. (B) Photograph representing
the SoftBank Robotics NAO humanoid robot while playing the Trust Game with a child (subject).
other player by calculating how many trials it takes for the
child not to follow the other player’s guess. Mistrust is assumed
when the child does not follow the other player’s guess on three
consecutive trials. The last phase [Trusting Restoration (TR)]
shares the same play structure as the initial phase. The game
lasted, on average, between 10 and 20 min.
Each phase consisted of a maximum of 10 trials and ended
after trust acquisition (phase 1), mistrust acquisition (phase 2),
and trust restoration (phase 3). The switch to the following phase
also occurred if the participant completed 10 trials within a
given phase without completing the three-trial sequence. The
dependent variable (DV) was the number of trials the child
required before acquiring trust or mistrust. For example, in the
initial phase, if the child started to follow the other player for
three consecutive trials after the second trial (i.e. 0 0 1 1 1), the
participant scored 2. If the child displayed trust immediately (i.e.
1 1 1), s/he scored 0. If the child completed the 10 trials within
each phase without acquiring trust or mistrust, she/he scored 8,
which is the maximum value that could possibly be attributed
before ending the phase with a three-trial sequence. To compare
data in the analyses, trust and trust restoration indexes were
reversed to indicate, alongside trust loss, a comparable measure
of the tendency to trust. Thus, a child could score between 0 (low
trust) and 8 (high trust).
For the treatment of missing cases, we considered mean,
median, and mode values, as well as children’s most common
response patterns. The median was ultimately chosen as
the most representative index for replacing missing values.
Accordingly, two children were recovered for age groups
3, 5, and 9 years; one child was recovered for the age
group 7 years. When an entire session was missing, the
values were not replaced and the child was removed from
the analyses. Accordingly, one child was removed from
age group 3 years and three children were removed from
age group 7 years.
Theory of Mind
The Unexpected Transfer task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983)
and the Unexpected Content task (Perner and Wimmer,
1985) were used to evaluate first-order ToM by assessing the
acquisition of false beliefs understanding. First-order ToM entails
a recursive thinking, which implies the meta-representation or
the representation of a mental representation of a low complexity
level, of the kind “I think that you think. . .”. Children exhibit
this competence at around 4 years of age with the emergence
of false beliefs. The child is told a story involving two doll
characters. One of the characters is deceived with respect to
either the location or contents of an object and the child is
tested for his/her ability to understand the character’s false
belief. For example, the unexpected transfer story is about two
siblings playing with a ball in a room. One of the children puts
the ball in a box and leaves the room. Meanwhile, the other
child takes the ball out of the box, puts it in the basket and
goes away. Finally, the first character comes back in the room
and wants to play with the ball. At the end of the story, the
experimenter asks the child the following questions: “What is
the first place where she will look for the ball?”—referring to
the first character (first-order false belief question); “Where did
the child put the ball before going away?” (control memory
question); “Where really is the ball?” (reality control question).
The answers to the two control questions (memory and reality)
were used to filter the children’s performance. Having passed
control questions, the test question about false belief is scored 1 if
correct and 0 if incorrect.
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The development of a second-order false belief competence
was assessed through the Ice-Cream Van task (Perner and
Wimmer, 1985) and the Look-Prediction task (Liverta Sempio
et al., 2001; Astington et al., 2002). Second-order ToM implies
a meta-representation of a greater complexity with respect to
first-order ToM, of the kind “I think that you think that s/he
thinks. . .”. Children aged from 7 years have typically matured
this competence, although it can also emerge at an earlier age.
The second-order ToM stories involve three characters presented
on a storyboard. For example, the ice-cream van story is about
Maria and Giovanni, who – while playing in the park – see
an ice-cream van. Maria wants to buy an ice cream, but she
has no money. She therefore decides to go home to take the
money, sure that the ice-cream van will stay in the park. However,
while Maria is away, Giovanni sees the ice-cream van moving
away. Giovanni asks the ice-cream man where he is going,
and the ice-cream man replies that he is going in front of
the school to sell more ice creams. While Maria is leaving
home, she sees the ice-cream man and she asks him where
he is going. After knowing that he is moving to school, she
says that now that she has the money, she can follow him
to school. At the end of the story Giovanni goes to Maria’s
house, and asks her mother where her friend is. Maria’s mum
answers that Maria has just gone out to buy an ice cream.
The child (participant) is then asked the following questions:
“Where does Giovanni think Maria went to buy the ice cream?
(second-order false belief); “Why does Giovanni think so?”
(justification); “Does Maria know that the ice-cream van is in
front of the school?” (first-order false belief); “Does Giovanni
know that the ice-cream man spoke with Maria while she was
leaving her house?” (reality control question); “Where did Maria
go to buy the ice cream?” (memory control question). For
both second-order false belief tasks, having passed the control
questions, children scored 1 for correct statements and 0 for
incorrect statements on both test and justification questions.
A second-order false belief task total score was then calculated
ranging from 0 (no response) to 2 (completely correct response)
(Perner and Wimmer, 1985).
Separation Anxiety Test–Family Version (F-SAT)
The Separation Anxiety Test is a semi-projective task that
evaluates the child’s mental representation of his/her attachment
to the caregiver. The original version developed by Hansburg
(1972) for adolescents was adapted by Klagsbrun and Bowlby
(1976) for children aged 4 to 7 years. In the latter version, six
pictures are presented to the child, each depicting a situation
of separation from a familiar caregiver. The child is asked to
describe the protagonist’s feelings, to justify them, and to predict
what the protagonist will do, thereby probing the coping strategy
of the protagonist. The Italian version used in this study (Liverta
Sempio et al., 2001) is based on a modification of other versions
of the same task (Fonagy et al., 1997).
The coding reflects three dimensions: (1) attachment, i.e. the
ability to express vulnerability and need; (2) self-confidence, i.e.
the ability to autonomously face separation; and (3) avoidance,
i.e. the propensity to speak about the separation. Participants
score 1 for each dimension. The final score is the result of
the sum of the scores in the attachment scale and in the
self-confidence scale, and of the sum of the inverse of the
avoidance scale, calculated by subtracting this score from the
total amount potentially obtainable on this scale. Scores range
from 6 to 36, with higher scores reflecting greater quality of
attachment relationship.
Executive Function Skills
Children aged 3 and 5 years were administered the DCCS
assessing the capacity to switch responses [for a full description
of the test, please refer to Zelazo (2006)]. Seven and 9-year-
olds’ executive functions were assessed using “A Developmental
NEuroPSYchological Assessment” subtest (NEPSY II; Korkman
et al., 2007), testing the ability to inhibit automatic responses
and to switch between response types. The child looks at a
series of black and white shapes or arrows and names either the
shape or direction or makes an alternate response, depending
on the color of the shape or arrow. In the present study, we
used the combined scores of the Inhibition NEPSY-II subtest,
which associates accuracy and speed of response. For a detailed
description of the scoring criteria, please refer to the manual
(Korkman et al., 2007).
Experimental Procedure
Introducing the Play Partners
On a day that preceded the main experimental session, children
were introduced to three play partners (two humans – a boy and
a girl – and the robot) through video clips displayed in class on a
large projector. In the videos, each of the potential partners said
the same sentence: “Hello, my name is. I will be playing with you
in the next days. See you soon. Bye.” The videos represented the
actors while exiting a room and waving their hand to say goodbye.
In this way, the children saw that the robot NAO could walk, talk,
and move its head and arms.
Experimental Sessions
The children were tested individually in a quiet room in their
kindergarten or school. Tests were carried out by two researchers
both in the morning and in the afternoon during normal activity.
In the first session, the administration of the battery lasted
approximately 20–30 min, depending on the child’s age. The
administration of the task in the second session took about 35–
45 min.
The first session started with the administration of AMS. The
five AMS state categories (Perceptive, Emotional, Desires and
Intentions, Imaginative, and Epistemic) were randomized across
children. Afterward, children participated in the TG. At this
point, the partner (i.e. human or robot) entered the experimental
room and was introduced by the experimenter by his/her name:
“Do you remember, this is . . .”. Then, both the child and the
partner were invited to sit on the ground on a plastic carpet in
front of an ad hoc table. The plastic carpet was used to correctly
position NAO when children interacted with the robot. A paper
black board was positioned next to the table, and was used to
cover the setting when playing. A female experimenter played
with girls and a male experimenter played with boys. Half of
the children played with the robot in the first session and with
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the human in the second session. The other half underwent the
reversed play order.
After the game, the child was administered one of the two
first-order ToM tasks and, starting from 5 years of age upward,
one of the two second-order ToM tasks. The order of the
ToM tasks was randomized across children, so that those who
performed, for example the unexpected transfer task in the first
session, completed the unexpected content task in the second
session. The same was true for the second-order ToM tasks.
Finally, children were given two further assessments: SAT and
executive function.
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis was carried out using the IBM Statistical
Software Platform SPSS (v. 19.0). To evaluate possible differences
in children’s tendency to trust the human and robot partner
as a function of the child’s age and trust phase (acquisition,
loss, and restoration), a repeated measures General Linear
Model (GLM) analysis was carried out. The DV was the
number of trials until children followed their partner (trust
acquisition), stopped following their partner (trust loss), and
again followed their partner (trust restoration) during the TG. To
compare data from the three phases, trust and trust restoration
indexes were reversed to indicate, together with trust loss, a
comparable measure of the tendency to trust. That is, for all
three phases of the TG, greater numbers correspond to a greater
tendency to trust.
Additionally, correlation analyses (Pearson’s r) were carried
out to evaluate the relationship between the tendency to trust
and (1) the quality of attachment relationships (SAT), (2) ToM
(first- and second-order false beliefs tasks), and (3) executive
function skills.
Finally, to assess possible differences in children’s mental states
attribution to the robot with respect to the human partner, a
repeated measures GLM analysis comparing AMS scores between
human and robot was carried out as a function of the children’s
age. For all the GLM analyses, the Greenhouse–Geisser correction
was used for violations of Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity, P < 0.05.
All post hoc comparisons were Bonferroni corrected.
RESULTS
Trusting Game
The GLM analysis, with three levels of phase (acquisition,
loss, and restoration) and two levels of agency (HB and
RB) as within-subjects factors, and age group (four levels)
as the between-subjects factor (3, 5, 7, and 9 years), was
carried out to assess children’s tendency to trust in the
human and in the robot. An inspection of the box plots
displaying the performance of each age group showed
no extreme cases.
The results revealed a main effect of phase (Figure 2A),
F(2, 172) = 10.51, P < 0.001, partial-η2 = 0.11, δ = 0.99,
indicating that, independent of agency and age group, children
exhibited a lower tendency to trust in phase 3 (trust restoration),
compared to both phase 1 (trust acquisition), Mdiff = 1.19;
SE, 0.26; P < 0.001, and phase 2 (trust loss), Mdiff = 0.94;
SE, 0.27; P < 0.01. Additionally, age-related differences were
found, F(3, 86) = 8.76, P < 0.001, partial-η2 = 0.23, δ = 0.99.
More specifically, 3-year-olds showed a greater tendency to
trust than the other age groups including the 5-year-olds,
Mdiff = 1.83; SE, 0.52; P < 0.01; 7-year-olds, Mdiff = 1.1;
SE, 0.53; P < 0.05; and 9-year-olds, Mdiff = 2.64; SE, 0.53;
P < 0.001. No interactions were found between phase and age
group, P > 0.05. Additionally, agency did not have any impact
as a main effect and in the interaction with the other variables,
P > 0.05.
Having found a consistent correlation across ages between
first-order ToM and performance in the TG as described below,
a further GLM was carried out using first-order ToM as a
covariate. This analysis revealed a main effect of agency (Robot –
RB > Human Being – HB), F(1,85) = 4.99, P < 0.05, partial-
η2 = 0.06, δ = 0.60, and a significant interaction of agency × age
group, F(3, 172) = 2.81, P < 0.05, partial-η2 = 0.09, δ = 0.66.
The post hoc analyses showed that while 3-year-olds tended to
generally trust in the human more than in the robot, Mdiff = 1.04;
SE, 0.67; P < 0.05, children aged 7 years tended to trust in the
robot more than in the human, Mdiff = 1.33; SE, 0.56; P < 0.05.
This interaction is plotted in Figure 2B.
FIGURE 2 | Trust scores for the Trusting Game. Children’s average tendency to trust during the Trusting Game (A) across the three phases of trust (acquisition, loss,
and restoration) and (B) across age groups for the human (HB) and the robot (RB) when controlling for the effect of Theory of Mind. The bars represent the standard
error of the mean. *indicates significant differences.
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Correlations
Trusting and SAT
As shown in Table 1, most of the significant correlations
between the quality of attachment relationships (SAT) and the
tendency to trust were positive, i.e. more securely attached
children showed a greater tendency to trust in the play
partner’s choice. These relationships were found mainly
when children played with the human, and especially in the
youngest age group. For 3-year-olds, all SAT dimensions
(except for avoidance) correlated positively with a greater
tendency to trust in the human, including during the
trust loss phase. For 7-year-olds, quality of attachment
positively correlated with the tendency to trust during the
trust loss phase.
For 9-year-olds, the results also showed a positive relationship
between trust acquisition and the SAT sub-dimension of
attachment, indicating that more securely attached children
tended to acquire trust quicker. Additionally, among 9-
year-olds, there was a positive correlation between the
tendency to trust during the trust loss phase and the SAT
sub-dimension of avoidance. This correlation was also
significant across ages.
A positive correlation was finally found between the SAT
sub-dimension of attachment and the tendency to trust in the
robot for 3-year-olds during the restoration of trust phase. No
significant correlations were found for 5-year-olds.
Trusting and ToM
The scores on the two ToM tasks were merged into one single
score for each level of complexity (first and second order).
A low level of ToM performance (coded 0) included children
who scored 0 (failed) on both tasks, whereas a high level of
performance (coded 1) included children who passed at least one
ToM task at each complexity level. Table 2 reports descriptive
data for the ToM tasks.
All correlations found between the tendency to trust and
ToM scores were negative. Thus, greater ToM abilities were
associated with a lower tendency to trust, i.e. with a more
reflective tendency to trust. This relationship was independent
of the partner’s agency (human or robot) or the child’s age.
The tendency to trust was often significantly correlated with
first-order ToM, which was therefore included as a covariate in
the GLM model described above. Finally, a substantial negative
correlation between the tendency to trust and second-order
ToM was observed during the acquisition of trust for children
aged 7 years when playing with the human. These statistics are
reported in Table 3.
Trusting and Executive Function Skills
Children aged 3 and 5 years were administered the DCCS,
which assesses the capacity to switch between responses
(Zelazo, 2006). The same skill was assessed in 7- and 9-
year-olds using the “Developmental NEuroPSYchological
Assessment” subtest (NEPSY II; Korkman et al.,
2007). To compare data across age groups, scores
were standardized.
Significant age-related positive relationships were found
between the ability to switch and the tendency to trust during
the restoration phase among 3-year-olds when playing with the
human, r(19) = 0.49, P < 0.05, and among 7-year-olds when
playing with the robot, r(22) = 0.43, P < 0.05.
TABLE 1 | Association between Trust and SAT.
SAT sub-dimensions
Playing with human Playing with robot
Trust phase Age group (N) Attachment Self-confidence Avoidance TOT Attachment Self-confidence Avoidance TOT
(A) 3 years (17) 0.429 0.606** −0.236 0.422 0.161 −0.053 0.14 −0.132
Acquisition 5 years (20) −0.042 −0.227 0.088 −0.205 0.282 0.007 −0.004 0.1
7 years (22) 0.2 0.008 −0.264 0.302 −0.135 0.063 −0.12 −0.06
9 years (23) 0.477* −0.118 −0.306 0.259 0.412 −0.003 0.056 0.224
Overall −0.059 0.027 0.156 −0.172 0.097 −0.025 0.102 −0.056
(B) 3 years (17) 0.557* 0.746** −0.248 0.579* 0.393 0.353 −0.267 0.272
Loss 5 years (20) −0.195 −0.012 0.023 −0.095 0.198 −0.025 0.138 −0.014
7 years (22) 0.526* 0.066 0.068 0.412 0.188 0.153 0.247 −0.021
9 years (23) −0.177 −0.273 0.487* −0.262 0.048 0.209 −0.106 0.187
Overall −0.146 0.092 0.218* −0.14 0.07 0.158 0.052 0.007
(C) 3 years (17) 0.298 0.418 0.039 0.163 0.629** 0.459 −0.307 0.48
Restoration 5 years (20) 0.129 0.093 −0.147 0.264 0.362 0.079 −0.118 0.33
7 years (22) −0.17 0.044 0.05 −0.106 0.269 0.22 −0.016 0.139
9 years (23) −0.146 −0.073 0.068 −0.188 0.077 0.009 0.109 0.084
Overall −0.066 0.128 0.05 0.005 0.203 0.205 −0.08 0.209
Correlations between the tendency to trust during (A) the acquisition, (B) loss, and (C) restoration of trust and the quality of attachment relationships (SAT), sub-dimensions
(attachment, self-confidence, avoidance), as well as total SAT. **Correlation is significant at the level 0.01 (two-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the level 0.05 (two-tailed).
Significant values are in bold.
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TABLE 2 | ToM descriptives.
Age group (years/N) First-order ToM Second-order ToM
Low (%) High (%) Low (%) High (%)
3 (22) 68 32 – –
5 (24) 25 75 50 50
7 (24)* 0 96 20 76
9 (23) 0 100 13 87
Percentage of children in each age group (years) displaying a low or high first and second-order Theory of Mind (ToM). *One missing case.
TABLE 3 | Association between Trust and ToM.
Playing with the human Playing with the robot
Trust phase Age group (N) First order Second order First order Second order
1 – Acquisition 3 years (21) −0.225 − −0.306 −
5 years (24) 0.091 0.071 −0.231 −0.187
7 years (23) −0.501* 0.029
9 years (23) −0.176 −0.03
Overall (90/69) −0.315** −0.235 −0.278** −0.144
2 – Loss 3 years (21) −0.28 − −0.424* −
5 years (24) 0.079 −0.356 −0.303 −0.285
7 years (23) −0.267 0.004
9 years (23) −0.091 0.112
Overall (90/69) −0.278** −0.244* −0.365** −0.09
3 – Restoration 3 years (21) −0.119 − −0.329 −
5 years (24) 0.024 −0.151 −0.033 0.058
7 years (23) 0.358 0.317
9 years (23) −0.298 −0.019
Overall (91/70) −0.163 −0.066 −0.219* 0.143
Correlations between the tendency to trust and ToM score. **Correlation is significant at the level 0.01 (two-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the level 0.05 (two-tailed).
First-order ToM had a constant value for age groups 7 and 9 years and correlations could not be calculated. Significant values are in bold.
Attribution of Mental States
A repeated measures GLM analysis comparing AMS scores
between human and robot, with five levels of state (perceptual,
emotions, intentions and desires, imagination, and epistemic)
and two levels of agency (HB and RB) as within-subjects factors,
and age group (four levels) as the between-subjects factor, showed
a main effect of state, F(4, 332) = 71.72, P < 0.001, partial-
η2 = 0.46, δ = 1, a main effect of agency (HB > RB), F(1,
83) = 82.10, P < 0.001, partial-η2 = 0.50, δ = 1, an interaction
of state × age group, F(12, 332) = 5.18, P < 0.001, partial-
η2 = 0.16, δ = 1, an interaction of agency × age group, F(3,
83) = 8.66, P < 0.001, partial-η2 = 0.24, δ = 0.99, an interaction
of state × agency, F(12, 332) = 19.99, P < 0.001, partial-η2 = 0.19,
δ = 1, and a three-way interaction between state, agency, and age
group, F(12, 332) = 2.31, P < 0.01, partial-η2 = 0.85, δ = 0.96. This
interaction is represented in Figure 3.
Exploring the three-way interaction, the most consistent
difference was for the attribution of perception (HB > RB), which
was significant for all four age groups, P < 0.01. Attribution
of epistemic states was also greater for HB than RB for all age
groups, P < 0.01, except 5-year-olds, for whom there was a
trend toward significance, P = 0.07. Attributions of emotion
and imagination were similar for HB and RB among 3- and
5-year-olds, but greater for HB among 7- and 9-year-olds,
P < 0.05. Finally, only 9-year-olds ascribed greater intentions
and desires to HB than RB, Mdiff = 4.00; SE, 0.63; P < 0.001.
These post hoc analyses are summarized in Figure 3. Overall,
these analyses confirm that humans and robots are differentiated
even by 3-year-olds with respect to perception and epistemic
states with that differentiation spreading to all five states
among 9-year-olds.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated trust dynamics when children
aged 3, 5, 7, and 9 years played a TG in vivo with either a human
or a robot partner. Children’s tendency to trust decreased across
the three phases of the game, from acquisition to restoration of
trust. Also, 3-year-olds displayed a greater tendency to trust in
both play partners compared to the other age groups, although
initially placing their trust more easily in the human than in
the robot. The opposite was observed for the 7-year-olds, who
generally placed more trust in the robot than the human.
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FIGURE 3 | Children’s scores on the Attribution of Mental States (AMS) scale. AMS mean scores for the human (HB = blue bar) and the robot (RB = orange bar) for
each age group (3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds) as a function of state (Perceptual, Emotions, Intentions and Desires, Imagination, Epistemic). The bars represent the
standard error of the mean. * indicates significant differences.
To better understand age changes in trust, the results for
quality of attachment relationships, false belief understanding,
and executive function skills were examined. It has been
previously shown that children aged 3 and 4 years are
likely to endorse information provided by someone who
proved accurate in the past (see also Koenig and Harris,
2005; Pasquini et al., 2007; Harris, 2007). The results for
SAT deepen this observation. Among 3-year-olds, we
found that the SAT sub-dimension of self-confidence was
positively associated with selective trust in the human,
probably because these children’s past relationships were
secure, thus increasing the perception of the unfamiliar
experimenter as trustworthy. On the contrary, the robot was
an entity with which children had never had any relational
experience, further skewing the youngest children’s trust
preference toward the human. Additionally, it was found that
the youngest children – and particularly securely attached
children – showed a tendency to retain trust during the loss
of trust phase, confirming a certain behavioral rigidity as
introduced above. However, when realizing that the other was
no longer trustworthy, they switched to trusting the robot
more. This result supports the observation that when very
young children’s expectations are betrayed (loss of trust),
they are less forgiving than older children (Harris, 2007);
additionally, our findings enrich previous results (Corriveau
and Harris, 2009) by further showing that children who
are securely attached in infancy are more flexible when
investing their trust.
The development of a fundamental cognitive ability makes
a substantial contribution to trust dynamics in child–robot
interaction across all age groups. According to our findings,
the development of ToM appears to temper the relation
between quality of attachment relationships and trust, by
introducing into the trust matrix a mentalistic evaluation of
the other’s judgment based on an awareness of her/his/its
beliefs. More specifically, children who had developed at
least first-order ToM also knew that the other player did
not know the position of the doll, and was therefore an
unreliable informant. Not by chance, the effect of ToM on
trusting behavior was most evident at 3 and 7 years of age,
typically marked by the development of increasingly complex
levels of ToM. When children start developing the concept
of the other’s mind, they are also able to evaluate whether
the other (either a human or a robot) is trustworthy on
the basis of informational access. Preferential trust in either
agent then moderates.
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The dichotomy found between the younger and older age
groups in the AMS to the robot and the human further helps to
delineate the children’s perception of the robot as a mentalistic
agent: For younger children, the robot is perceived as more
mentalistically comparable to the human than for older children.
Nevertheless, when younger children decided to trust a play
partner, the affective component prevailed over the more “cool”
mentalistic component, defining the preferred relational target
accordingly (i.e. the human). On the other hand, the trust
attributed to the robot by older children may stem from the
dominance of a cognitive over an affective engagement.
In support of agent-specific differences in trusting behavior
between 3- and 7-year-olds, the results also revealed a positive
association between the ability to switch and trusting behavior
during the trust restoration phase among children aged 3 and
7 years. Strikingly, and consistent with the data discussed above,
these relations were specific to playing with the human partner
for the 3-year-olds, and to playing with the robot for the 7-
year-olds. In general, these correlations indicate that a greater
tendency to recover trust in the other is associated with the
development of the ability to switch. The specificity related
to the play partner’s agency further underlines the relevance
of the interactive partner for the child and reflects children’s
engagement with one or the other player: 3-year-olds’ selective
trust in the human was plausibly influenced by the quality
of attachment relationships – as also evidenced by data on
attachment described above; 7-year-olds preferential trust in
the robot was possibly due to an emerging familiarity with
artificial devices typical of this age. These results shed light
on previous findings (Lucas et al., 2013) that showed that,
compared to false belief understanding, executive functions
skills do not play an essential role in building selective trust
in an informant, at least within specific cultural frames. In
our study, we did find that executive function skills played
a role, though not during the phase of trust acquisition,
but rather during trust restoration. Here, the child’s ability
to switch was possibly required to re-organize information
and re-establish trust in an informant that, during the loss
of trus phase, became unreliable. Executive function skills
may then be specifically involved in building trust only
under specific conditions, which had not been empirically
assessed so far.
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The present study provided some insight into the dynamics of
trust both when relating to a human and a robot partner. Our
results highlighted the impact of cognitive development, as well
as children’s attachment history. We found that cognition and
attachment operated separately (given the absence of a direct
correlation between these two dimensions) on the establishment
of trust. Particularly for children aged 3 years, trust appears to
be significantly influenced by the affective dimension of trust,
especially when interacting with a human. Interestingly, although
securely attached children exhibited a greater tendency to trust
the human, they also shifted their trust more rapidly in the trust
restoration phase with the robot. This may be due to the lack of
any affective bond with the robot and to the child’s cool relational
attitude toward it. Effectively, this would render the robot a more
“forgivable” partner.
Also, the development of false belief understanding proved
to play a significant role in the establishment of trusting
relationships. In particular, the development of mentalizing
abilities enabled children to reflect rationally on the fact that
the other player had exactly the same guessing opportunities
as they did, and was therefore as susceptible to making
mistakes as they were. This moderated the effect of the affective
component of trust.
In the present study, the robot proved to be less susceptible
to the dynamics associated with the quality of attachment
relationships, and thus became a more stable trusted partner. For
this reason, and particularly for children with fragile affective
relational histories who have difficulties with trust, the robot
might fulfill a significant scaffolding role in human–human
interaction. However, an evolution of the robot as a social
partner is also to be expected. Therefore, different relational
dynamics may be anticipated, according to which, perhaps, an
affective relation history will be created with this new entity.
In this respect, a longitudinal study would further delineate the
development of trust in the robot increasing the robustness of the
findings. Also, a larger sample size would eventually confirm the
observed tendencies.
Last, but not least, the findings from this study may inform
disciplines such as Developmental Robotics on how cognitive
architectures can be modeled in the robot so as to make it trusting
in the human partner in a “human-like” fashion, as discussed
above. This circular behavior would make the human–robot
relationship increasingly ecological and, ultimately, trustful.
Starting, for example, from the architectural model designed by
Vinanzi et al. (2019), in which the robots’ trust in an informant
varied as a function ToM, the present findings clearly indicate
further psychological factors that may be integrated in the robot
to design the robot’s trust in the human at different developmental
levels. Recent technical and theoretical achievements in the field
of social robotics have encouraged researchers to develop social
robots as tutors and learning companions for children (e.g.
Movellan et al., 2009; Tanaka and Matsuzoe, 2012; Breazeal et al.,
2016). Therefore, studying the mechanisms by which children
learn from robots, and vice versa, is of vital importance.
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